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We are in receipt of the text of the opinion handed down on May 31, 1899,
by the Supreme Court of the Hawaiian Islands in reference to the applicability
of provisions of the United States Constitution to the newly acquired country.
The cases are those of Peacock &- Co. v. RePublic of Hawaii and Lovejoy 6"
Co. v. Republic of Hawaii.
. These were actions for the recovery of money paid under protest by the
plaintiffs as custom duties at Honolulu since the annexation of Hawaii to the
United States. The substantial question raised was whether the Hawaiian
government could continue after the annexation of the islands to the United
States to collect duties at the rates prescribed by the Hawaiian laws in force
immediately before annexation. The joint resolution which provided for the
annexation vested this power in the Hawaiian government. The contention of
the plaintiffs was that immediately upon the cession of the islands the same
became so far a part of the United States as to be subject to the provisions of
the Constitution, and that, therefore, the legislation imposing the levy of cus-
toms duties as then existing under the Hawaiian laws was unconstitutional and
void, being opposed to Article I, Sec. 8, "All duties and excises shall be uni-
form throughout the United States," and Article I, See. 9, " Nor shall vessels
bound to or from one State be obliged to enter, clear, or pay duties in another."
The court refused to sustain this contention, holding that under the then ex-
isting circumstances, the provisions of the United States Constitution were
inapplicable to the Islands.
The line of argument adopted by the court was summed up by the same
court in a subsequent opinion (Re/iublic of Hawaii v. G. L. Edwards), as
follows: "Assuming that various provisions of the Constitution of the United
States, in regard to which there is great difference of opinion, extend for the
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purposes of ordinary or permanent Congressional legislation to territory belong-
ing to the United States, as well as to the States proper, they do not necessarily
extend of their own force to newly acquired territory immediately upon its
acquisition, but that the laws and government of its ceded territory continue
for such reasonable time as may, in the judgment of the political department
of the government, be deemed requisite for the enactment of suitable legisla
tion for the new territory in conformity with the provisions of the Constitu-
tion."
In arriving at this conclusion the court draws a distinction between territory
belonging to the United States after Congress has enacted such legislation as
amounts in effect to a declaration by that branch of the government that the
territory is to be henceforth regarded as fully incorporated into the American
Empire and territory, in regard to which no such representation has been
made, and which may be regarded, at least for certain purposes, as in a transi-
tion state or only inchoately annexed, holding that the application of the Consti-
tution, an instrument framed by reasonable men and with reference to recog-
nized principles, depends upon the circumstances of the case. "The Constitu-
tion contemplates the acquisition of territory by cession or by conquest, and
whether one of these methods or the other is pursued, the recognized and
appropriate rules may be followed. It is a recognized principle of municipal
and international law that, after the analogy of a deed, a change of sover-
eignty does not ordinarily take effect until delivery."
The court then discusses the question of acquisition by conquest, arriving
at the conclusion that the Constitution would not extend to the conquered ter-
ritory e.Profrio vigore. The opinion proceeds: "If the Constitution would
not extend forthwith to newly acquired territory in case of conquest and treaty
of peace, is there any reason why it should in case of an acquisition by ces-
sion alone? * * * If the Constitution is not in force in the newly acquired
territory at once, it is not because of necessity-a necessity with reference to
which and to the recognized principles growing out of it, the Constitution
must be presumed to have been framed. Can it be said that there is not the
same necessity in the case of cession as in the case of conquest, because in the
former case time may be taken to provide for a change of laws and government
before the cession is made? Could it not be said with equal force that such
time might be taken before the ratification of a treaty of peace in case of con-
quest?"
The plaintiffs, however, contended that Congress has already acted in this
case-reference being had to the clause in the joint resolution concerning the
customs laws. To this the court replies:
"Now, in the first place, the mere fact that Congress has taken some
action in regard to newly acquired territory, is not sufficient to indicate that
in its opinion such territory has become or ought to be considered fully incor-
porated into the American Empire. If annexation is accomplished by joint
resolution, that of itself is action by Congress with reference to the territory
acquired. That is not sufficient. There must be legislation to such extent,
or of such character as to indicate that in the opinion of Congress the territory
has become essentially a part of the United States. The legislation must be
something more than of a mere temporary or provisional character. If the
clause of the joint resolution referred to indicates anything, it indicates,
especially when taken in connection with the other clausts, that Congress was
of the opinion that it was not then in a position to make permanent provision
for these islands, and that it needed further light and further time to enable it
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to do so. The legislation continuing the Hawaiian customs relations cannot be
held unconstitutional and void, as positive independent legislation in contro-
vention of the clause of the Constitution in question. The joint resolution
must be treated as a whole. It is an attempt to annex these islands to a cer-
tain extent or for certain purposes for the time being, full annexation to be
contemplated at a later period."
A general summary of the opinion may be stated as follows: That the
Constitution of the United States was framed by reasonable men to provide
for the requirements of a sovereign nation and must be construed with refer-
ence to recognized principles; that construed with reference to those princi-
ples, all its provisions that may be ultimately applicable to acquired territory
do not necessarily extend to it of their own force immediately upon conquest,
or the ratification of a treaty or the passage of a joint resolution of annex- "
ation; that this is well settled in certain cases, as, for instance, in case of cession
until transfer of possession, and in case of conquest until treaty of peace;
that there is much reason to believe that it may be so even after transfer of
possession or treaty of peace until such action is taken by Congress as indi-
cates that incorporation of the new territory into the United States is regarded
as completed; that there is no distinction in this respect founded in reason
between a cession in a treaty of peade and a cession by treaty in time of peace,
or between a cession by treaty and a cession in pursuance of a joint resolu-
tion, and-that the power to acquire by treaty or joint resolution as well as the
power to acquire by conquest carries with it all necessary and proper inciden-
tal powers, one of which may be the temporary continuation of the laws of the
acquired territory, though inconsistent with certain specific provisions of the
Constitution, the duration of which temporary status is within the discretion
of Congress.
The case of Hawaiv. G. L. Edwards, referred to in the Peacock case,
was one of a criminal nature. The defendant having been convicted of a crime,
sued out a writ of error based on the ground that the trial and conviction were
illegal because the indictment had been found a true bill by the circuit judge,
as required by the Hawaiian statutes, and not by a grand jury as supposed to
be required by the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States,
and because the verdict was rendered by ten only of the twelve petit jurors as
permitted by Hawaiian statutes, and was not unanimous as supposed to be
required by the Sixth Amendment of the-said Constitution. In the decision of
this case the court adopted substantially the same line of reasoning as in the
Peacock case. Though beth of these cases involved the construction of the
joint resolution of annexation, in the Peacock case, which involved the- con-
stitutional provision with reference to uniformity of customs duties, it was
expressly declared in the joint resolution that the customs relations of these
islands with the United States and other countries should continue until the
United States customs laws should be extended to these Islands, while in the
present case there is no clear declaration one way or the other. One clause in
the joint resolution provides: "The existing treaties of the Hawaiian Islands
with foreign nations shall forthwith cease and determine, being replaced by
such treaties as may exist, or as may be hereafter concluded, between the
United States and such foreign nations. The municipal legislation
of the Hawaiian Islands, not enacted for the fulfillment of the treaties so
extinguished, and not inconsistent with this joint resolution, nor contrary to
the Constitution of the United States, nor to any existing treaty of the United
COMMENT.
States, shall remain in force until the Congress of the United States shall
otherwise determine." The defendants argued that on the principle of exfires-
sio unius exclusio alterius, the expression of an intention to continue in force
those Hawaiian laws which were not inconsistent with the Constitution of the
United States implies an intention to discontinue those laws which were incon-
sistent with the Constitution. The opinion of the court, in which they refuse
to sustain this contention, may be summarized as follows:
That the argument is founded on inference, and being so founded, it
must take into consideration not only the inference from the particular clause
referred to, but all the inferences that may be deduced from the joint resolu-
tion as a whole and from the circumstances under which it was adopted; that
the inference is not a necessary one, it being subject of modification or re-
buttal by other inferences; that the continuation of certain Hawaiian laws does
not of necessity repeal the remainder; that. as decided in the Peacock case, the
municipal legislation of Hawaii would continue in force temporarily in the
absence of any declaration on the subject one way or the other, therefore to
make the inference in question would be to hold that the sentence of the
joint resolution under consideration was intended to be, not, as it purports,
an affirmative declaration of what should continue, but an indirect repeal of
what was not declared to continue, and that on general principles such a con-
struction should not be favored; that this general principle finds support in
the course pursued in reference to other repeals in the joint resolution,
the same directly repealing certain portions of the Hawaiian law (Chinese
immigration, and in the paragraph in question, Hawaiian treaties); that this
view finds further support in the general intentions of Congress as shown by
the resolution as a whole, inasmuch as Congress did not attempt to go into
particulars except with reference to a very few matters with regard to which
there was special reason for making particular provision; that it is improbable,
in view of this general intention manifested in the joint resolution as a
whole; that Congress intended by the incidental indirect clause in question to
repeal large and most important portions of Hawaiian laws blindly, without
any knowledge of the result and without substituting other necessary provis-
ions in their places; that it is obvious from the decision in the Peacock case
that there is at least much reason to believe that Congress did not intend to
extend the Constitution in all its fullness to these islands immediately, and
that the construction contended for should not be put upon the clause in
question if that can be avoided; that this construction can be avoided in
that the clause in question is a declaratory as distinguished from.a remedial
provision-declaring what the rule would be in, the absence of any provision
on the subject, and that inasmuch as this provision (continuing Hawaiian
laws) was inserted. it was necessary for the sake of truth and exactness to
name the exceptions.
